Explore the Charts

The chart presents the distribution of different channels (social media, video sites etc.) where respondents have seen "a lot" or "a great deal" of false or misleading information about coronavirus. The participants in six countries have answered to the following question "Q4: How much false or misleading information about coronavirus (COVID-19), if any, do you think you have sen on each of the following in the last week?" Social media, messaging apps and video sites have been found the main sources of false or misleading information.

This graph shows the top 10 platforms linked to Islamic State accounts and top 10 platforms linked to other Jihadist accounts on Twitter. The data shows that YouTube was the preferred platform for both types of accounts. Interestingly, Facebook was not in the top 10 for Islamic State accounts but was number 2 for other Jihadist accounts.

The graph shows the cumulative suspension rate for all accounts identified as being Islamic State or Jihadi by the number of days the accounts survived before being suspended (on the horizontal axis). The data shows that Islamic State accounts have had higher suspension rates compared to other Jihadi accounts. The chart focuses on accounts that were independently judged to have breached Twitter’s terms of service.

The graph shows the cumulative suspension rate for all accounts identified as being Islamic State or Jihadi by the number of days the accounts survived before being suspended. The data shows that Islamic State accounts have had higher suspension rates compared to other Jihadi accounts.

The chart shows the top 10 countries that host web pages with child sexual abuse material, based on the assessment of the Internet Watch Foundation. Interestingly, seven out of 10 countries are in Europe and six out of 10 are in the European Union.

The chart provides information on the number of web pages containing adverts or links to child sexual abuse imagery, according to the age of children. The data shows an increase of these web pages in 2019 by 26% compared to 2018 and by 70% compared to 2017.

The chart compares the number of tweets, retweets, and mentions achieved by ISIS accounts compared to a randomly sampled set of users, based on data collected from Twitter. The random sample of users received significantly more retweets and mentions per account. The random sample also received more retweets and mentions per tweet, but the difference there was much smaller.

This graph shows the percentage of suspended users who were able to tweet 10, 100, 1,000, or more times before being suspended. Based on data collected from Twitter, this chart shows that ISIS accounts seem to successfully tweet more posts before being suspended, compared to the entire population of suspended accounts.